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1.  INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the
behavior of the retail price of gasoline in Tokyo and
Osaka using the predictions from several dynamic
pricing models. These predictions are based on the
recent infinitely repeated game theories, supergame
theories. The imprecation of these theories shows
that the expected future changes and the unexpected
future changes in the economic environment, where
firm face (for example, demand or cost conditions)
will affect their current price setting if the firms
engage in competition in a repeated game context
[see, for example, Green and Porter, 1984;
Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; and Haltiwinger and
Harrington, 1991]. A second purpose of the paper is
to examine the impact of deregulation of the oil
industry on the behavior in Tokyo and Osaka in
Japan. Different responses to current and future
economic conditions by firms in Tokyo and Osaka
provide one explanation for differing behavior of
gasoline prices in the two prefectures.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a
brief survey of recent studies relating to the
Japanese and the North American oil industries are
presented. To examine how an interaction in long
run between gas stations influences the direction of
the behavior of retail price, the section 3 surveys
several supergame theories including the situation
of imperfect monitoring. Section 4 details the
models to be estimated, while section 5 describes
the data used. Estimated results are presented in
section 6.
2.  RESEARCH ON THE OIL INDUSTRY 
At the end of March 1996, the provisional law
relating to the importation of specified petroleum
products (Tokutei sekiyu seihin yunyu zantei
sochiho, called Tokusekiho) that restricted imports
of specified petroleum products (gasoline, kerosene,
light oil) to a certain number of companies was
abolished. As a result, the importation of specified
2petroleum products was liberalized. In June 1994, it
became clear that the Tokusekiho would be
abolished at the end of March 1996. Despite this
liberalization, total imports of specified petroleum
products relative to total production in Japan have
been very small, and the number of new importers
of these products has remained rather small. At
around the same time the government made the
decision to abolish the Tokusekiho, the retail price
of gasoline began to fall a little sharply. As a result,
the media has often suggested the abolition of the
Tokusekiho was a successful case of deregulations.
There have been several recent studies of Japanese
oil industry. Prior to the actual abolition of the
Tokusekiho, Chida [1996] provides some
simulation results that suggest that the wholesale
price of gasoline will fall as a result of the
Tokusekiho’s abolition. Onishi et al.’s [1997]
graphical analysis of the national retail price of
gasoline suggests that the abolition significantly
reduced the retail price of gasoline. Goto’s [1999a]
analysis of the impact of the protection provided by
Tokusekiho showed that it was associated with an
upward shift in the cost function of several of the
major Japanese oil refiners. Goto [1999b] applies
cointegration analysis to the relationship between
the wholesale and retail prices of gasoline and
attempts to verify whether the relationship has been
affected by the abolition of the Tokusekiho. Goto
and McKenzie [2001]　shows empirically how the
retail gasoline price was influent by the change of
the expected future environment firms will face,
using recent developments of supergame theories.
However, it is difficult for firms to expect the
environment perfectly and it should be natural to
consider that the volatility of the retail gasoline
price is influent by the unexpected change of the
environment. This paper attempts to show how the
future changes and the unexpected shock in the
environment contributes to the fluctuation of the
retail or wholesale gasoline market in Japan.
In contrast, using detailed firm level data, Slade
[1987 and 1992] suggests that gas stations in
Vancouver have set a collusive price rather than a
Nash equilibrium price. Borenstein and Shepard
[1996] using city level gasoline data for the United
States apply the ideas of Rotemberg and Saloner
[1986] and Haltiwinger and Harrington [1991] that,
in a repeated game context, the future changes in
the economic environment (for example, demand
and cost factors) will affect current collusive prices.
Their evidence indicates that expected future
demand and cost changes do influence current
gasoline prices, suggesting that gas stations are
behaving in a manner consistent with a repeated
game.
3. MODELS OF DYNAMIC PRICING
The purpose of this paper is to estimate models for
retail price of gasoline based on the prediction
deriving from the recent infinitely repeated game
theories, supergame theories. The prediction
implies that both the future changes and the current
unexpected shock in the economic environment,
where firms faces, do have an impact on the current
retail price of gasoline. Using monthly time series
data on Tokyo and Osaka for the 1990’s, this paper
shows evidence consistent with the implication of
the theories. Some evidence presented also suggests
the behavior of retail prices has changed over the
time period being examined.
It is assumed that firms commit either to a price or
a quantity in Bertrand or Cournot competition
before unexpected shocks. In Cournot competition,
when firms commit to quantity, a shift (price
elasticity of supply is zero in the short-run), an
unexpected increase (decrease) in demand merely
causes an increase (decrease) in the current price
with consequential increases (decreases) in profits.
In the next period, while the unexpected increase in
demand in the previous period does not cause the
tripping of the trigger strategy, the unexpected
decrease in demand in the previous period does
cause the tripping of the trigger strategy so that
prices could be expected to fall. That is ute >0
causes pt ^ and pt+1 unchanged, ute <0 causes pt v
3and pt+1 v, the response in period t is symmetric,
but the response in t+1 (and in the subsequent
periods the trigger strategy is tripped) is
asymmetric. 
What about an unexpected increase (decrease) in
marginal costs? In Cournot competition, provided
marginal cost does not increase above price, since
the demand curve does not shift and firms have
committed to a particular quantity, there is no
change in price. As a result, the trigger strategy is
not tripped. That is, current and future prices do not
respond at all to an unexpected change in the
current marginal costs!
4. ESTIMATED MODEL
The model in section 3 indicates that when gas
stations are facing a state of mutual dependence,
and behave cooperatively, the collusive price may
result from firms forecasting their future
economic environment and choosing their behavior
accordingly. To take account of this, the following
price equation was estimated
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In order to estimate the price equations, it is
necessary to calculate the expected values of future
demand and wholesale prices in some way. Here,
we follow Borenstein and Shepard’s [1996]
approach of fitting equations for Q  and W , and
then using the computed predicted values from
these equations as estimates of the expected values.
The estimated equations are of the following form:
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where 
tj
S  is a seasonal dummy for the jth month.
To save space, estimates of equations (2) and (3)
are no presented.
5. DATA
The monthly data used in this paper run from
October 1990 to October 1999. Data on retail
gasoline prices at a prefectural level were obtained
from the Monthly Survey of the Market Situation of
Oil Products ( Sekiyu seihin shijo getsuji chousa)
produced by the Japan Energy Economic Research
Institute’s Oil Information Center ( Nihon Enerugi
keizai kenkyusho Sekiyu joho senta). This data is
obtained from surveys of the price of regular
gasoline sold at gasoline stations. The surveys are
carried out on the tenth day of each month.
Data on wholesale gasoline prices were obtained
from the Nikkei NEEDS database using the price
paid by traders who purchase gasoline from
refineries and distribute it to gas stations. Data on
gasoline prices at the wholesale level are not
available at a prefectural level so the wholesale
price is treated as being the same across Japan.
Data on retail sales of gasoline at a prefectural level,
4the price of crude oil, and the number of gasoline-
powered vehicles registered in Japan were also
obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS database.
Although retail price and sales data is available for
all 47 prefectures in Japan, the analysis in this paper
is limited to the prefectures of Tokyo and Osaka.
An examination of the retail prices in these two
prefectures suggests that there are some substantial
differences in the behavior of retail prices in Tokyo
and Osaka after mid-1994.
6. RESULTS
Estimates of equation (4) for Tokyo and Osaka are
presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. For both
prefectures, retail price equations are estimated
using three samples: all the data (1990:11-1999:10);
the first half of the data (1990:11-1994:5); and the
second half of the data (1994:6-1999:10). The time
at which the sample is divided into roughly two
halves, 1994:6, is when the abolition of the
Tokusekiho was formally decided. Estimates using
ordinary least squares and instrumental variables
are presented; the latter takes account of the
possibility that all the explanatory variables in (4) 
may be correlated with the equation’s error. The
instruments used varied across the time periods and
prefectures being considered, but they were drawn
from seasonal dummies, time trend (and its square),
lagged demand, lagged wholesale price, current and
lagged rebate, current and lagged price of imported
gasoline, and current and lagged number of
registered gasoline-powered vehicles.
There are two reasons for computing the t-statistics
in all cases using Newey-West’s [1987] correction.
First, the diagnostic tests in most cases provide
evidence of strong serial correlation in the error.
Secondly, computing the fitted values of expected
future quantities and retail prices causes a generated
regressor problem [see Pagan, 1986; and McKenzie
and McAleer, 1997] that, in general, induces serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity in the equation’s
error. Limitations on the availability of relevant
data on a monthly basis severely restricted our
attempts to investigate the possibility that it was
misspecification of the equation that was causing
the significant diagnostic test results.
For Tokyo, all the signs of the estimated
coefficients, excluding the expected future
quantities, are consistent with the predictions of the
Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] model presented in
section 3. For all the sample periods, at least one of
the expected future variables is statistically
significant. This finding is consistent with game
theoretic models that suggest future changes in the
economic environment will affect current price
setting by firms if the firms are engaged in
competition in a repeated game context. 
For Osaka, the signs of the estimated coefficients,
excluding the expected future quantities, are also
consistent with the predictions of the Rotemberg
and Saloner [1986] model when the whole sample
and the first half of the data are used. Both these
signs are however reversed for the second half of
the data suggesting a structural change around the
time the abolition of the Tokusekiho was decided.
As with Tokyo, the signs of the estimated
coefficients for current and expected future
quantities are the opposite of those predicted by the
theoretical model. For all the sample periods, at
least one of the expected future variables is
statistically significant. 
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6Table 1: Estimated Retail Price Equations for Tokyo
________________________________________________________________
1990:11-1999:10 1990:11-1994:5 1994:6-1999:10
Estimator OLS-NW IV-NW OLS-NW IV-NW OLS-NW IV-NW
________________________________________________________________
Qit -0.24 -0.26 -.004 -0.016 -0.023 
(6.02) (7.28) (3.50) (3.68) (3.12)
Wt 2.293 6.211 4.434 4.779 1.404 1.50
(5.00) (3.64) (6.24) (6.88) (16.69) (27.73)
e
it
UQ                                           0.020
                                                  (2.05)
e
t
UW                     1.096    1.429    1.430    -.0.687  -0.583
                         (2.37)    (3.51)   (3.33)    (3.93)   (5.56)
Qe 1it+ -0.024 -0.405 -0.028
(5.61) (4.61) (3.82)
We 1t+ -1.12 -5.095 -4.671 -4.979
(2.66) (2.86) (4.81) (5.41)
s 1.921 1.932 0.969 1.007 1.87 1.97
R2 0.978 0.975 0.886 0.750 0.952 0.951
SC 82.90* 71.86* 29.68* 28.33* 53.92* 42.70*
FF 26.73* 54.05* 0.73 16.42 2.38 26.16*
H 0.603 0.045 0.02 0.075 7.13* 0.51
ST na 5.805 na 1.588 na 1.441
________________________________________________________________
Notes: OLS-NW and IV-NW denote estimation using ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV), respectively, with
the t-statistics adjusted using the Newey-West (NW) correction. Figures in parentheses are absolute values of the t-statistics. s and R2
denote the standard error of the regression and the coefficient of determination [for models estimated by instrumental variables this is the
generalized R2  measure proposed by Pesaran and Smith, 1994). SC, FF and H denote tests for 12th order serial correlation, functional
form misspecification and heteroscedasticity, and are distributed as χ2 variates with 12, 1 and 1 degrees of freedom under their
respective null hypotheses. ST is Sargan’s general misspecification test for models estimated by instrumental variables. For these
diagnostic tests, a ‘*’ indicates significance at the 5% level. An entry of na, indicates that the ST are inapplicable for models estimated
by OLS. Estimates of the constant are not presented.
7Table 2: Estimated Retail Price Equations for Osaka
_________________________________________________________________
1990:11-1999:10 1990:11-1994:5 1994:6-1999:10
Estimator OLS-NW IV-NW OLS-NW IV-NW OLS-NW IV-NW
_________________________________________________________________
Qit -0.0184
(4.91)
Wt 9.764 4.115 5.572 4.797 1.782 1.848
(2.48) (3.64) (5.96) (8.29) (4.01) (4.00)
e
it
UQ         0.253    0.276                     0.172    0.152
                (7.93)    (4.38)                     (3.63)   (3.63)
e
t
UW             2.100             1.990   1.544    -1.662   -1.573
                (2.27)             (2.86)   (2.72)    (3.77)   (4.44)
Qe 1it+         -0.049 -0.478 -0.019 -0.014 -0.0745 -0.061
(2.27) (6.62) (2.93) (3.20) (2.23) (2.02)
We 1t+ -8.927 -3.058 -6.194 -5.171
(2.17) (2.75) (4.51) (5.54)
s 4.934 4.961 1.296 0.646 5.298 5.282
R2 0.841 0.841 0.826 0.646 0.774 0.771
SC 94.92* 94.54* 32.38* 33.56* 53.24* 53.03*
FF 45.63* 42.13* 2.21 5.30* 37.19* 36.91*
H 24.09* 24.70* 0.03 0.814 0.05 0.013
ST na 2.537 na 13.38 na 22.80
_________________________________________________________________
Notes: As for Table 1.
